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Note
Heeding the Call of Cassano v. Cassano:
The Need to Amend the Child Support
Standards Act
I. Introduction
In 1989, the New York Legislature enacted the New York
Child Support Standards Act [hereinafter CSSA] 1 with the in-
tent to provide guidelines that would ensure uniformity and eq-
uity in the calculation and awarding of child support, and to
ensure that children would share in the economic status of both
their parents. 2 Child support calculations are based on com-
bined parental income [hereinafter CPI], 3 a pro rata share of
1. L. 1989, ch. 567 (codified at N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW §§ 236, 240 and at N.Y.
FAM. CT. Aar § 413). Technically, "CSSA" refers only to the Child Support Stan-
dards Act of 1989, L. 1989, ch. 567. "CSSA," however, is commonly understood to
refer to the statutes that were amended in 1989 (primarily N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§ 240 and N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 413) as well as to all subsequent amendments to the
same statutes. That practice is followed here. See Judith Reichier, Budget Bill
Includes Changes in Child Support Laws, 207 N.Y. L.J. 1 (1992). See also N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAw § 236 (L. 1980, ch. 281 (amended 1989)) (McKinney Supp. 1995);
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240 (L. 1962, ch. 313 (amended 1989, 1990, 1992, 1993,
1994)) (McKinney Supp. 1995); N.Y. FAm. CT. ACT § 413 (L. 1962, ch. 686
(amended 1989, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1994)) (McKinney Supp. 1995). See infra notes
73-75, 91.
2. See MEMORANDUM OF ASSEMBLYWOMAN HELENE WEINSTEIN, NEW YORK
STATE LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL 248 (1989) [hereinafter WEINSTEIN]; GOVERNOR'S AP-
PROVAL MEMORANDUM, NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL 249 (1989) [herein-
after GOVERNOR'S MEMORANDUM]. See also discussion infra part II.C. In 1989, the
rate of dissolution of marriage in New York State was 3.4 per 1,000 population.
See BUREAu OF BIOMETRICS, N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF HEALTH, VrrAL STATISTICS OF
NEW YORK STATE 98 (1992) [hereinafter BUREAU OF BIOMETRICS].
3. CPI refers to the total income of both parents including, but not limited to,
gross income as reported on the most recent tax return, additional investment in-
come, additional deferred income, workers' compensation, social security, unem-
ployment insurance benefits and disability benefits, less specified deductions
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which is assigned to each parent and designated as their sup-
port obligation. 4 When total CPI is equal to or below $80,000,
statutory percentage calculations are automatically applied to
determine the amount of child support.5 As to CPI exceeding
$80,000, courts are afforded wide discretion to consider enumer-
ated statutory alternatives in calculating child support obliga-
tions based on this income.6 A problem arises from the fact that
the statutory language does not clarify whether courts must
justify using CPI above $80,000 as part of the basis of child sup-
port obligations, or whether CPI above $80,000 is presump-
tively part of the basis of child support obligations.7 As a result,
courts have treated CPI above $80,000 differently and results
have varied.8
The New York Court of Appeals addressed this problem in
Cassano v. Cassano,a where it dealt with the issue of whether a
court must articulate reasons for basing a child support award
on the application of the statutory percentages to income above
$80,000.10 The court of appeals held that the percentage calcu-
lations could be presumptively applied to income above $80,000,
and articulated the proper statutory interpretation to be ap-
plied in an attempt to settle conflicts among the lower courts.1'
However, the court also reiterated that lower courts retain dis-
cretion to address such income using the statutory percentages,
enumerated statutory factors, or some combination of both. 12
As a result of the dual nature of the court's opinion, practition-
including, but not limited to, public assistance, supplemental security income and
FICA taxes actually paid. See DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1-b)(b)(4), (5); FAm. CT. ACT
§ 413(1)(b)(4), (5).
4. See DOM. REL. LAw § 240(1-b); FAM. CT. AcT § 413(1). See also discussion
infra part II.C.
5. See DOM. REL. LAw § 240(1-b)(c)(2); FAM. CT. ACT § 413(1)(c)(2). See infra
note 79.
6. See DOM. REL. LAw § 240(1-b)(c)(3), (f); FAM. CT. AcT § 413(1)(c)(3), (f). See
infra note 80.
7. See discussion infra part II.E.
8. See discussion infra part II.E.
9. 85 N.Y.2d 649, 651 N.E.2d 878, 628 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1995). See discussion in-
fra part III.B.
10. 85 N.Y.2d at 654, 651 N.E.2d at 881, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 13.
11. See id. See also discussion infra part III.B.
12. 85 N.Y.2d at 655, 651 N.E.2d at 882, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 14. See discussion
infra part III.B.
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ers and families may expect continued inconsistencies in lower
court decisions.' 3
This Note will examine child support calculations prior to
the CSSA and compare child support awards subsequent to its
enactment. Further, this Note will explore the impact of Cas-
sano on calculations of child support and will argue the need for
amendment of the CSSA.
Part II of this Note discusses how child support awards
were calculated prior to the passage of the CSSA, and explains
the developments which led to its enactment. Part II also
presents a general overview of the CSSA and discusses various
reactions of practitioners and commentators as to the founda-
tion of the CSSA and the effect of its enactment. Part II con-
cludes by exploring practitioners' assumptions and lower courts'
treatment of CPI above $80,000 prior to Cassano.
Part III introduces Cassano and explains its procedural
history and the unanimous holding. Part III also discusses
practitioners' reactions to the decision and concludes with a dis-
cussion of lower courts' calculations of child support awards
subsequent to the decision. Part IV analyzes the decision in
Cassano and illustrates that, while Cassano was certainly a
step in the right direction, in that it attempted to clarify statu-
tory interpretation, the decision nonetheless leaves the door
open for continued inconsistencies in lower court awards of
child support.
This Note concludes that the CSSA should be amended to
eliminate the $80,000 cap, after which courts would calculate
child support awards by applying the appropriate statutory per-
centage to the total CPI. The resulting obligations could then
be reviewed in light of the enumerated statutory factors, as a
13. See discussion infra part IV. Obviously, the issues surrounding child sup-
port calculations and awards are of great interest to our society. In 1994, there
were 4.4 million single, divorced parents in the United States. See CENSUS Bu-
REAu, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HOUSEHOLD AND FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS:
MARCH 1994 20 (1994). In 1992, New York State recorded 57,683 divorces, at least
26,132 of which involved children. See BUREAU OF BIOMETRICS, supra note 2, at
103. "Divorce accounted for 98.8% of all dissolution of marriages in New York
State in 1992." Id. at 92. The dissolution of marriage rate in New York for 1992
was 3.2 per 1,000 population. See id. at 98. Further, the dissolution rate of mar-
riages in New York State from 1970-1992 did not fall below 3.0 per 1,000 popula-
tion. See id.
1997] 407
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safeguard against unjust or inappropriate awards. This ap-
proach is superior to that left in place by Cassano as it would
better serve legislative intent by (1) ensuring predictability by
absolutely defining the point at which statutory factors would
first be considered, (2) ensuring equitable results by allowing
discretion when individual circumstances warrant, and (3) en-
suring that children would share in the economic status of both
parents.
II. Background
A. The Calculation of Child Support Prior to the CSSA
Prior to the implementation of formulaic child support
guidelines, and absent agreement of the parties, "New York...
relied on court discretion for the determination of [child] sup-
port awards .... ,,14 Courts calculated child support awards
based on consideration of general statutory factors found in
either the Domestic Relations Law15 or the Family Court Act.
16
As a result, "child support orders were often based upon a deter-
mination of what portion of the non-custodial parent's income,
after expenses had been met, could be made available to share
14. Peter Leehy, Note, The Child Support Standards Act and the New York
Judiciary: Fortifying the 17 Percent Solution, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 1299, 1304 (citing
I. ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW 355 (1986)).
15. See DOM. REL. LAw §§ 236, 240 (McKinney 1986), amended by L. 1989, ch.
567. DOM. REL. LAw § 236 contained the child support provisions of the "Equitable
Distribution Law" (L. 1980, ch. 281) and covered a broader range of matrimonial
actions than DoM. REL. LAW § 240. See Alan D. Scheinkman, Supplementary Prac-
tice Commentary, DOM. REL. LAw § 240 at 641 (McKinney 1986). The Equitable
Distribution Law "generally cleansed the Domestic Relations Law, the Family
Court Act, the General Obligations Law, and other chapters of out-moded distinc-
tions based solely upon gender." Alan D. Scheinkman, Supplementary Practice
Commentary, DOM. REL. LAW § 236 at 140 (McKinney 1986). Specifically, the Eq-
uitable Distribution Law altered "the considerations to be taken into account in
determining the issue of child support .... Id. at 142. Effectively, the child sup-
port provisions of DOM. REL. LAw § 236 were superimposed over the similar provi-
sions of DOM. REL. LAW § 240. See Scheinkman, supra, DOM. REL. LAW § 240, at
641.
Courts calculated child support awards by examining (1) the financial re-
sources of the parents and the child, (2) the child's physical and emotional health
and vocational needs, (3) the standard of living the child would have had if the
marriage had not dissolved, (4) the tax consequences to the parties, and (5) non-
monetary contributions of the parents towards the care of the child. See DOM. REL.
LAw § 236 (7)(a)(1)-(5) (McKinney 1986).
16. See FAM. CT. AcT § 413 (McKinney 1986), amended by L. 1989, ch. 567.
408
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in providing for the expenses the custodial parent had for the
child."'17
Because the courts were vested with wide discretion when
calculating child support awards, courts disagreed over what
factors should be given more weight in their computations of
such awards. The following cases illustrate the discrepancies
that existed between courts' approaches to calculating child
support prior to enactment of the CSSA.
In Tornese v. Tornese,'8 the plaintiff challenged the amount
of child support, alimony and counsel fees awarded by the New
York State Supreme Court, Westchester County in its judgment
of divorce. 19 The New York State Appellate Division, for the
Second Department, deferred to the trial court's discretion to
determine the amount of the awards based upon a "balancing of
the various aspects of the marital relationship."20 In Kaplan v.
Kaplan,21 however, the Second Department, seemed to focus
more on the financial resources of the non-custodial parent.
There, the husband and wife were both practicing physicians
with a CPI of $127,500.22 The husband appealed an order di-
recting him to pay $600 per week in child support.23 Although
he conceded that amount of child support was necessary to
maintain the children's pre-existing standard of living, the hus-
band claimed that he could not afford the amount awarded
since he had remarried and his expenses totaled more than 97%
of his net income.24 In response to his arguments, the court re-
duced the husband's child support obligation to $400 per
week. 25
The plaintiff in Moran v. Moran26 appealed from a judg-
ment of divorce which awarded plaintiff custody of her three
children and $145 per week in child support.27 She argued,
17. Judith Reichler & Carol Lefcourt, The New Child Support Standards Act,
62 N.Y.S. B.J. 36, 37 (Feb. 1990).
18. 55 A.D.2d 602, 389 N.Y.S.2d 385 (2d Dep't 1976).
19. See id. at 602, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 386.
20. Id.
21. 77 A.D.2d 891, 430 N.Y.S.2d 692 (2d Dep't 1980).
22. See id. at 891, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 693.
23. See id.
24. See id. at 892, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 693.
25. See id.
26. 81 A.D.2d 740, 438 N.Y.S.2d 421 (4th Dep't 1981).
27. See id. at 740-41, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 422.
1997] 409
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among other things, that the award of child support was inade-
quate.28 The New York State Appellate Division, for the Fourth
Department, affirmed29 and stated that "[tihe fixing of the
amount of child support is discretionary with the trial court
upon its balancing of the various aspects of the marital relation-
ship and in the best interests of the child."30
In Iacobacci v. Iacobacci,3l the New York State Appellate
Division, for the Second Department, focused on the importance
of maintaining the children's pre-separation standard of living.
There, the wife appealed from an order which denied her cross
motion for temporary child support.3 2 The appellate court noted
that the divorce proceeding had been stayed 3 and that the hus-
band had reduced monthly payments to his wife and four chil-
dren.34 The appellate court reversed and awarded temporary
child support of $1000 per month because it was "clear that the
[husband had] not continued to support and maintain his family
in the same style and manner as he did before" the divorce ac-
tion was instituted.35
The husband in Parry v. Parry,36 an attorney 37 appealed
from a divorce judgment which ordered him to pay $150 per
week in child support.38 The parties had stipulated at trial that
the wife, a real estate agent,39 would have custody of their two
children.40 The New York State Appellate Division, for the
Fourth Department, upheld the child support award as properly
calculated based on the trial court's discretion "to weigh the rel-
ative financial positions of the parties, to evaluate the testi-
mony and determine what is in the best interests of the
children."41
28. See id. at 741, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 422.
29. See id. at 741, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 423.
30. Id. at 740, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 422-23.
31. 84 A.D.2d 759, 443 N.Y.S.2d 768 (2d Dep't 1981).
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. Id.
36. 93 A.D.2d 989, 461 N.Y.S.2d 616 (4th Dep't 1983).
37. See id. at 990, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 617.
38. See id. at 990, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 618.
39. See id. at 990, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 617.
40. See id.
41. 93 A.D.2d at 990, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 618.
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In Stevens v. Stevens, 42 the husband challenged a divorce
judgment which directed him to pay $240 per week in child sup-
port for his three children.43 The New York State Appellate Di-
vision, for the Third Department, noted that the trial court, in
calculating its child support award, failed to consider the spe-
cial physical, emotional or educational needs of the children, the
tax consequences to the parties as a result of the award and the
nonmonetary contributions of each party toward the children's
care. 44 The appellate court remitted the matter to the trial
court for a new determination of child support due to the "trial
court's nonobservance of the statutory directive that it address
all five factors pertinent to child support awards."45
B. Development of the CSSA
In 1984, Congress enacted the Child Support Enforcement
Amendments,4" which provided incentives for state govern-
ments to enforce child support orders.47 In this legislation, Con-
gress addressed the issue of inconsistent and inadequate child
support awards set by the courts and mandated that states in-
stitute numerical guidelines that courts could opt to use in their
discretionary awards of child support.4s
In 1985, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices (HHS) issued a report, authored by Dr. Robert G. Williams,
intended to assist the states in developing these child support
guidelines. 49 The report included a discussion of the cost of rais-
ing children,50 based primarily on research done by Thomas J.
Espenshade for the National Institutes for Child Health and
42. 107 A.D.2d 987, 484 N.Y.S.2d 708 (3d Dep't 1985).
43. See id. at 987, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 709.
44. See id. at 989, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 710.
45. Id. See DOM. REL. LAw §§ 236, 240 (McKinney 1986); FAM. CT. AcT § 413
(McKinney 1986). The statutory factors are discussed supra, note 15.
46. Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1305 (1984) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 602-71).
47. See Leehy, supra note 14, at 1303. Incentives included payments to states
equal to a percentage of total support collected annually and special project grants
to promote improvements in interstate enforcement. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 658, 655.
48. Leehy, supra note 14, at 1303.
49. See ROBERT G. WILLIAMS, PH.D., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV-
ICES, DEVELOPMENT OF GUIDELINES FOR ESTABLISHING AND UPDATING CHILD SUP-
PORT ORDERS: INTERIM REPORT (1985).
50. See id. at 8-37.
1997]
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Human Development.51 Williams stated "there is no absolute
'cost' of raising a child. Expenditures on a child within a house-
hold are inextricably dependent on the level of total household
expenditures. As overall household income increases, addi-
tional income is allotted to children as well as adults."52 Fur-
ther, according to Williams, "expenditures on children increase
with increases in family income as parents use some of their
discretionary income to enhance the children's standard of liv-
ing as well [as their own]."53 Additionally, Williams stated
"there is considerable evidence that the proportion of family
consumption devoted to a child declines very little, if at all, as
household consumption increases. Thus, the 'cost' of a child can
be accurately depicted as a proportion of family income
consumption."54
Williams then explained the differences between consump-
tion spending and household income: "[als income increases, to-
tal family consumption declines as a proportion of income
because of progressive federal and state income taxes and be-
cause savings increase with the level of household income. Con-
sequently, as gross income increases, Espenshade shows
expenditures on children declining as a proportion of gross in-
come. " 1 Using Espenshade's calculations as a starting point,
Williams concluded that for families with a gross income of
$50,000 and above, 12.8% of that amount would be spent on one
child, 19.8% would be spent on two children, and 24.8% would
be spent on three children.56
Williams' report also included an analysis of different
model guideline formulas that various states were either al-
51. See id. at 15-16. See THOMAS J. ESPENSHADE, NAT'L INST. FOR CHILD
HEALTH AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, INVESTING IN CHILDREN: NEw ESTIMATES OF
PARENTAL EXPENDITURES (1984).
52. WILLIAMS, supra note 49, at 9.
53. Id. at 18.
54. Id. at 9 (emphasis in the original).
55. Id. at 18. Williams also recalculated Espenshade's figures using net in-
come as a base, to illustrate that expenditures on children decrease as a proportion
of net income as well. See WILLIAMS, supra note 49, at 33. See also ESPENSHADE,
supra note 51.
56. See WILLIAMS, supra note 49, at 35. Williams derived his calculations by
combining Espenshade's research with the CONSUMER EXPENDITURES SURVEY
(1972-73) and with CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P-60, No. 145 (1983).
See WILLIAMS, supra note 49, at 35. See also ESPENSHADE, supra note 51.
412 [Vol. 17:405
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ready using or considering at that time,57 specifically discussing
whether these formulas reflected his research conclusion. 58
Williams cited Wisconsin's formula 59 as one approach that con-
flicted with his research, and explained "[blecause the Wiscon-
sin formula is designed as a constant percentage of gross
income, it also has the effect of setting orders as an increasing
percentage of net income, as obligor income rises."6 0 Williams,
57. See WILLIAMS, supra note 49, at 76-94. There were three conceptual mod-
els which served as the basis of child support formulas: (1) "Cost Sharing" where
the dollar amount of the child's needs is determined and apportioned between the
parents based on their respective incomes; (2) "Income Sharing" where a propor-
tion of parental income (either gross or net) is allocated to the children (and the
proportion may vary depending on the number of children and the level of parental
income); (3) "Income Equalization" where, in order to equalize standards of living
between the separate households, the parental income is allocated between the
households based on the number of persons in each. See WILLIAMS, supra note 49,
at 53. Williams selected four specific formulas: (1) the "Delaware Melson
Formula," a hybrid cost sharing/income sharing approach; (2) the "Washington
State Uniform Child Support Guidelines," an income sharing formula; (3) the
"Wisconsin Percentage of Income Standard," also an income sharing formula; (4)
the "Cassetty Model," an income equalization formula. See id. at 54 n.56 and ac-
companying text.
58. See WILLIAMS, supra note 49, at 76-94. Williams compared the Delaware,
Washington and Wisconsin formulas, and the Cassetty Model, with "a new guide-
line, termed the Income Shares model, developed by project staff as an example of
an approach that is consistent with the economic evidence, underlying objectives
and principles, and treatment of particular factors discussed in [his] report." Id. at
54. See supra note 57. See also supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
59. See supra note 57. Wisconsin's formula is based on gross income. See
WILLIAMS, supra note 49, at 59 (citing LINDA REIvrrZ, SECRETARY, WISCONSIN DEP'T
OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES, PERCENTAGE OF INCOME STANDARD FOR SETTING
CHILD SUPPORT AwARDS (Memorandum to members of the Wisconsin Judiciary)
(1983)). Williams further explained Wisconsin's formula:
Child support orders are established with reference only to the gross income
of the obligor and the number of children to be supported. The percentages
of obligor gross income allocated to child support are: 17[%] for one child,
25[%] for two children, 29[%] for three children, 31[%] for four children [and]
34[%] for five or more children. The payment obligation is not adjusted for
the income of the custodial parent. The standard assumes that each parent
will expend the appropriate proportion of income on the child or children
and that the custodial parent's share is spent directly on the child. If cus-
tody of the child or children is reversed, the same formula is applied to the
new non-custodial parent.
Id. at 59-60.
60. WILLIAMS, supra note 49, at 102-03. "As income increases, federal and
state taxes consume increasing percentages of gross income, lowering the relative
proportion of net income. Thus, at higher income levels, increasing percentages of
net income are required for child support to maintain the constant percentage of
gross income set in the Wisconsin formula." Id. at 86.
9
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however, went on to say that "even though the findings of recent
economic studies suggest that expenditures on children in in-
tact households fall as a proportion of either gross or net income
(as income increases), states may wish to structure the child
support objective differently."6' Williams concluded:
[Ilt is important for states, in initiating the developmental pro-
cess, to establish objectives for a desirable pattern of results to be
obtained from a formula. These objectives should reflect the
state's social values for the proper role of child support. States
should then select a basic conceptual model for child support that
most closely matches those objectives. 62
Three years later, the Federal Family Support Act [herein-
after FSA] of 198863 reiterated that states must develop child
support guidelines, and required courts to calculate child sup-
port awards in strict accordance with these guidelines.6
Although the New York State Legislature had already seen bills
introduced that addressed development of such guidelines, 65
the CSSA was finally enacted in response to this congressional
mandate.66
61. Id. at 103.
62. Id.
63. Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (1988) (codified at scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.). Portions of the FSA are mirrored in 45 C.F.R. § 302.56 (1992). See
NANCY S. ERICKSON, NATIONAL CENTER ON WOMEN AND FAMILY LAw, INC., CHILD
SUPPORT MANUAL FOR ATTORNEYS AND ADVOCATES at 215 n.81 (1992). See also 45
C.F.R. § 302.56.
64. See Leehy, supra note 14, at 1303-04.
65. Governor's program bill #208, S. 3733-a, 209th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1986);
Governor's program bill #55R, A. 6931, 210th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1987).
66. See Sanford S. Dranoff et al., Legislation: Child Support Standards Act,
in NEGOTIATING, DRAFTING, AND MODIFYING MARITAL AGREEMENTS 1990, at 75 (PLI
N.Y. Law Course Handbook Series No. 62, 1990). See supra note 1. Legislators
took heed of this mandate:
More than equity now demands enactment of child support standards.
Under the recently enacted federal welfare reform legislation, the Family
Support Act of 1988, P.L. No. 100-485, each state must establish binding
child support standards applicable in all cases. These standards must be in
effect by October, 1989. New York has already been threatened with up to
$133 million in federal sanctions if child support standards are not in effect
by that date.
WEINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 248.
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C. Discussion of the CSSA
1. Legislative History
Legislative sponsors of the bill stated that the CSSA would
ensure more equitable and adequate child support awards by
"setting forth a method in statute that yields a specific sum for
the support award, and by establishing a presumption that the
specific sum will be awarded unless to do so would be unjust or
inappropriate."67 The sponsors further stated that the CSSA,
with its "recognition of the need for judicial discretion where
unique circumstances are present, will promote greater state-
wide uniformity in child support actions."68 Former New York
State Governor Mario Cuomo, in his Approval Memorandum,69
voiced similar concerns about the inequities of child support
awards. Cuomo stated "[c]ourts have ordered child support ar-
bitrarily, and orders, although they have varied widely, almost
uniformly have been too low." 70 The Governor explained that
the CSSA promotes fairness in child support awards because
the formula is based on parental income and, therefore, "chil-
dren will share in the economic status of both their parents."71
Governor Cuomo stressed that affluent parents should contrib-
ute according to their means and, to this end, the CSSA "places
no limit on the amount of parental income to which the formula
may be applied, and mandates application of the formula to the
first $80,000 of parental income."72
2. The CSSA's formula
The CSSA amended, in relevant part, Domestic Relations
Law sections 23673 and 240,74 and section 413 of the Family
Court Act.75 The CSSA provided a formula, modeled after Wis-
67. WEINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 248.
68. Id. at 248.
69. GOVERNOR'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 2, at 249.
70. Id. at 250.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. DoM. REL. LAw § 236 (L. 1980, ch. 281), amended by L. 1989, ch. 567, §§ 4-
5 (McKinney Supp. 1995).
74. DOM. REL. LAw § 240 (L. 1962, ch. 313), amended by L. 1989, ch. 567, §§ 6-
7 (McKinney Supp. 1995). For subsequent amendments, see infra note 91.
75. FAM. CT. ACT § 413 (L. 1962, ch. 686), amended by L. 1989, ch. 567, § 8
(McKinney Supp. 1995). For subsequent amendments, see infra note 91.
1997] 415
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consin's child support guidelines legislation, 76 for calculating
child support awards in all child support proceedings. To calcu-
late the "basic child support obligation,"77 the court must first
calculate the CPI.78 Then, the CPI up to $80,000 is multiplied
by the appropriate child support percentage. 79 If the CPI ex-
ceeds $80,000, the court must apply the formula to the first
$80,000 of CPI and then determine the child support obligation
for the CPI above $80,000 "through consideration of [various]
factors set forth8° . . . and/or the child support percent-
76. See Dranoff et al., supra note 66, at 77 n.4. See 1985 Wisconsin Act 29.
For a discussion of the Wisconsin formula, see WILLIAMS, supra notes 49, 59 and
accompanying text.
77. DOM. REL. LAw § 240(1-b)(b)(1); FAM. CT. ACT § 413(1)(b)(1).
78. See DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1-b)(c)(2); FAM. CT. ACT § 413(1)(c)(2). See
supra note 3.
79. See DOM. REL. LAw § 240(1-b)(c)(2); FAM. CT. ACT § 413(1)(c)(2). The child
support percentage to be applied varies according to the number of children:
(i) seventeen percent of the [CPI] for one child; (ii) twenty-five percent of the
[CPI] for two children; (iii) twenty-nine percent of the [CPI] for three chil-
dren; (iv) thirty-one percent of the [CPI] for four children; and (v) no less
than thirty-five percent of the [CPI] for five or more children.
DOM. REL. LAw § 240(1-b)(b)(3); FAM. CT. ACT § 413(1)(b)(3). As to the source of
the statutory percentage figures:
The figures used in the formulas were first developed by researchers in
Wisconsin, who analyzed studies on the costs of children and the rates that
resources are shared in two-parent and single-parent families. Based on
their information, a percentage of income was determined which reflected
the percentage that would be likely to be shared with children by their
parents.
The best estimate of the researchers was that the first child consumes
20-30% of family income, with each subsequent child costing about half as
much as the previous one. These percentages were reduced for a number of
reasons. First, they were reduced based on the potential additional earn-
ings capacity of the custodial parent. Second, they were reduced to account
for the non-custodial parent's additional expenses and the cost for normal
visitation. Lastly, it was felt that such high rates might encourage non-sup-
port. While none of these reasons for a lower percentage defined an exact
percentage amount, they struck a balance of conflicting objectives: provid-
ing adequately for the children and assuring fairness to both parents.
Reichler & Lefcourt, supra note 17, at 40 n.7. See supra notes 57-60 and accompa-
nying text.
80. DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1-b)(c)(3); FAM. CT. ACT § 413(1)(c)(3). The factors
to be used as a basis for variation from the formula are set forth in paragraph (f) of
the statutes and are substantially as follows: (1) The financial resources of both
parents and of the child; (2) The child's physical and emotional health and his/her
special needs and aptitudes; (3) The standard of living the child would have en-
joyed had the marriage not dissolved; (4) The tax consequences to the parties; (5)
The parents' non-monetary contributions toward the care and well-being of the
416
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age."81 The resulting calculations based on CPI are then di-
vided between the parents "in the same proportion as each par-
ent's income is to the [CPI]."82
3. The Statutory "Cap"
Since the CSSA treats CPI above $80,000 differently from
income below that amount, $80,000 of CPI is commonly consid-
ered the "dividing line" or "cap" in the statute.83 While the As-
sociation of the Bar of the City of New York [hereinafter
NYCBA] believed income "caps" in child support guideline legis-
lation were necessary to ensure adequate and consistent child
support awards,8 4 the NYCBA supported an income "cap" of
$100,000.85 The NYCBA stated that "[r]esearchers have indeed
reported that inadequate support may be a greater problem in
upper-income than in lower-income families."8 6 The NYCBA
cited "[a] California research project . . . [which] determined
that the greatest downward mobility following divorce was ex-
perienced by middle and upper-middle-class women and their
children."87 The NYCBA concluded "a $100,000 cap [would]
child; (6) The educational needs of either parent; (7) A determination that one
parent's gross income is substantially less than the other parent's gross income;
(8) The needs of the non-custodial parent's children who are not subject to the
instant action and for whom the non-custodial parent is providing support; (9) If
the child is not on public assistance, extraordinary expenses incurred by the non-
custodial parent in exercising visitation, or in extended visitation if the custodial
parent's expenses are substantially reduced as a result; (10) Any other factors the
court determines are relevant. DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1-b)(f); FAm. CT. ACT
§ 413(1)(f).
81. DOM. REL. LAw § 240(1-b)(c)(3); FAM. CT. ACT § 413(1)(c)(3). The percent-
ages that could be applied here are identical to the ones applied to CPI below
$80,000. See supra note 79.
82. DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1-b)(c)(2), (); FAm. CT. ACT § 413(1)(c)(2), (f). If the
non-custodial parent's pro-rata share is found to be unjust or inappropriate in light
of the "paragraph (f)" factors, the court shall reduce the non-custodial parent's sup-
port obligation. See DoM. REL. LAW § 240(1-b)(f), (g); FAM. CT. ACT § 413(1)(f), (g).
83. See DOM. REL. LAw § 240(1-b)(c)(2), (3); FAm. CT. ACT § 413(1)(c)(2), (3).
84. See COMMITTEE ON STATE LEGISLATION, ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE
CITY OF N.Y., SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES LEGISLATION
527 (1989) [hereinafter ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR].
85. See id.
86. Id. at 528.
87. Id. (citing LENORE WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 334 (1985)). "The
[California] researchers found that men with incomes over $50,000 were required
to pay approximately half as much of their net incomes in alimony and child sup-
port as men with incomes under $10,000." ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR, supra note 84,
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provide maximal flexibility to upper-income families in plan-
ning post-divorce obligations, while ensuring that children at
all income levels share in their parents' standard of living,"88
and "[a] lower cap . . . would seriously jeopardize the central
goals of child support guidelines by reintroducing unpredictabil-
ity in the support allocation process and the risk of inadequate
awards."8 9
4. Amendments to the CSSA
The CSSA, nevertheless, specified an $80,000 cap, and this
provision has not been amended.90 Several other CSSA provi-
sions have been amended;91 the 1992 Amendments of section
240(1-b)(g) of the Domestic Relations Law and of section
413(1)(g) of the Family Court Act are most relevant to this dis-
cussion. 92 Prior to the 1992 amendments, if a court deviated
from the presumptive statutory guideline calculation of child
support based on a finding that an unjust or inappropriate
amount would be awarded, it was required to state the statu-
tory factors considered in reaching that conclusion, as well as
the "reasons for the level of support."93 Under the amended
statute, however, "the court must set forth both the presump-
tive amount and the 'reasons the court did not order the pre-
at 528 n.7 (citing WEITZMAN, supra, at 267). "Researchers in Ohio and Vermont
have similarly reported that divorced men paid proportionately less support as
their incomes increased." ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR, supra note 84, at 528 (citing
Robert E. McGraw et al., A Case Study in Divorce Law Reform and Its Aftermath,
20 J. FAM. L. 443, 479 (1981)). See also, James B. McLindon, The Economic Disas-
ter of Divorce for Women, 21 FAM. L. Q. 351, 369-72 (1987); Heather Ruth Wishik,
Commentary: Economics of Divorce, 20 FAM. L. Q. 79, 97 (1986).
88. ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR, supra note 84, at 528.
89. Id.
90. See DOM. REL. LAw § 240(1-b)(c)(2), (3); FAM. CT. ACT § 413(1)(c)(2), (3).
91. DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1-b)(g), (1) and FAM. CT. ACT § 413(1)(g), (1), amended
by L. 1990, ch. 818, §§ 7, 8, 10, 11; DOM. REL. LAw § 240(1-b)(g), (h) and FAM. CT.
ACT § 413(1)(g), (h), amended by L. 1992, ch. 41, §§ 145, 146, 147, 148; DOM. REL.
LAW § 240(1-b) (1), § 240(2)(c) and FAM. CT. ACT § 413(1)(j), (1), § 413(3), amended
by L. 1993, ch. 59, §§ 18, 21, 23, 24; DOM. REL. LAw § 240(2)(b) and FAM. CT. ACT
§ 413 (3)(c), amended by L. 1994, ch. 170, §§ 362, 367 (McKinney Supp. 1995).
92. See DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1-b)(g) and FAM. CT. ACT § 413(1)(g), amended
by L. 1992, ch. 41, §§ 145, 147.
93. See Reichler, supra note 1, at 1 (citing DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1-b)(g); FAM.
CT. ACT § 413(1)(g)).
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sumptive amount.' 94 While "[t]his may seem like a subtle
difference, ... the amendment is aimed at assuring that devia-
tions [from presumptive guideline amounts] will be limited and
that reasons be stated as to why the presumptive amount was
not ordered."95
D. General Reactions to the CSSA
Some commentators expressed seemingly favorable reac-
tions to the CSSA. For example, one pair of commentators
noted that child support awards calculated pursuant to the
CSSA would reflect its new focus: "[The CSSA] shift[s] the em-
phasis from a balancing of the expressed needs of the child and
the income available to the parents after expenses to the total
income available to the parents and the standard of living that
should be shared with the child."9 Another commentator
stressed that the CSSA promotes fairness and predictability in
child support calculations: "The CSSA attempts to reduce the
arbitrariness of child support awards by using a pre-set
formula, with allowances for adjustment if the formulaic
method is shown to be unjust or inappropriate."97
Other commentators reacted less favorably to the CSSA
and questioned, for example, whether there would ever be a sit-
uation in which the statutory percentages were not automati-
cally applied: "[The] extensive burden of financial data
necessary to deviate from the guidelines may result in strict ap-
94. Reichler, supra note 1, at 1 (citing L. 1992, ch. 41, § 145, amending DoM.
REL. LAW § 240(1-b)(g); L. 1992, ch. 41, § 147, amending FAM. CT. ACT § 413(1)(g)).
95. Reichler, supra note 1, at 1. Reichler further explained:
[Tihe U.S. Department of Health and Human Services had this to say about
the additional requirements: "[T]he requirements for findings rebutting the
guidelines amount are intended to limit the circumstances under which de-
viations will be allowed.
Deviations from the guidelines amount should occur only in a limited
number of cases ... and then only when judges or other officials can justify
them."
Id. (citing 56 Fed. Reg. 22,335 at 22,347 (1991)). "Comments that accompanied the
federal regulations state that '[tjaken as a whole, the grounds for rebuttal may not
be inconsistent with the best interests of the child. This will ensure that the
child's best interests are a primary consideration in any decision to deviate from
the guidelines amount. . . .'" Id. (citing 56 Fed. Reg. at 22,346).
96. Reichler & Lefcourt, supra note 17, at 44.
97. Douglas J. Besharov, Supplementary Practice Commentary 1992, FAM. CT.
ACT § 413 at 21-22 (McKinney Supp. 1995).
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plication of the percentages."98 Another commentator discussed
the possible ramifications of presumptive application of the
statutory percentages: "[M]any attorneys fear that judges will
mechanically apply the percentages 'all the way up,' resulting in
a $75,000.00 child support award being imposed on a two-child
non-custodial parent who has statutory income of
$300,000.00."9 9
Commentators also questioned the derivation of the statu-
tory percentages. One commentator stated that while the CSSA
statutory percentages are based on a childrearing cost analysis
by Jacques Van der Gaag, °00 they do not reflect the actual re-
sults of the Van der Gaag study.10 1 Commentator Leehy ex-
plained that the CSSA formulaic guideline percentages "are
32[%] below [V]an der Gaag's estimate for the first child, 33[%]
below that for the second, 41[%] below that for the third, and
44[%] below that for the fourth."10 2 Van der Gaag's figures,
however, presumably include the cost of child care and ex-
traordinary medical care;10 3 the CSSA treats those costs as
add-ons. 0 4 Nevertheless, Leehy believes this difference is not
enough to justify such a drastic discrepancy between the study
and the adopted percentages. 0 5 Leehy concluded "[s]ince the
CSSA formulation fails to mirror the totality of childrearing
costs in postdivorce households, the guidelines cannot alone
provide a standard of living for children in divided households
equivalent to that enjoyed in the preseparation home." 06
Nancy Erickson, writing for the National Center on Women and
Family Law, 0 7 agreed, stating "guidelines based on studies of
expenditures in two-parent, two-income homes tend to underes-
timate the amount actually needed by the custodial parent to
98. Dranoff et al., supra note 66, at 89 (citing Dr. Doris Jones Freed & Joel R.
Brandes, New Legislation on Child Support Standards, 202 N.Y. L.J. at 3 (1989)).
99. Dranoff et al., supra note 66, at 90.
100. See Leehy, supra note 14, at 1318 (citing JACQUES VAN DER GAAG, INSTI-
TUTE FOR RESEARCH ON POVERTY, ON MEASURING THE COSTS OF CHILDREN (1982)).
101. See Leehy, supra note 14, at 1320.
102. Leehy, supra note 14, at 1319. See VAN DER GAAG, supra note 100.
103. See Leehy, supra note 14, at 1320. See also VAN DER GAAG, supra note
100.
104. DOM. REL. LAw § 240(1-b)(c)(5), (6); FAM. CT. ACT § 413(1)(c)(5), (6).
105. See Leehy, supra note 14, at 1320.
106. Id. at 1324.
107. See ERICKSON, supra note 63.
420 [Vol. 17:405
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol17/iss2/4
1997] CASSANO 421
raise the children, since a one-parent family has additional ex-
penses not considered by guidelines developers." 08 Erickson
also stressed that many economic studies disagree with Espen-
shade's conclusion that the percentage of income spent on chil-
dren decreases as income increases. 0 9
Erickson also strongly criticized the CSSA's use of a statu-
tory cap:
Many state guidelines currently specify a maximum level of in-
come to which they apply. Above that maximum, the court is di-
rected either to disregard the guidelines altogether or to revert to
the use of discretion with regard to whether extra child support
should be ordered (and, if so, how much) in addition to the guide-
lines amount on the income below the maximum. All of these
guidelines are out of compliance with the federal statutes and reg-
ulations and will have to be changed in order for the states to
avoid penalties." 0
Erickson cited a statement from the HHS which specified that
states are not allowed to use "caps" to exempt categories of in-
come from application of the statutory child support guide-
lines."' According to Erickson, the HHS stated:
108. Id. at 20-21. Erickson lists examples of these additional expenses, in-
cluding: (1) the cost of hiring someone to do chores that were done by the other
parent during the marriage; (2) the single parent's increased reliance on "conven-
ience" foods which are generally more expensive than cooking meals "from
scratch"; (3) babysitter costs. See ERICKSON, supra note 63, at 21.
109. See ERICKSON, supra note 63, at 195 n.38 (citing Philip Eden, Critique of
Interim Report, Development of Guidelines for Establishing and Updating Child
Support Orders, by Robert. G. Williams, in CRITICAL ISSUES, CRITICAL CHOICES:
SPECIAL Topics IN CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES DEVELOPMENT 105 (Women's Legal
Defense Fund, 1986); Nancy Polikoff, Looking for the Policy Choices Within an
Economic Methodology: A Critique of the Income Share Model, in ESSENTIALS OF
CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES DEVELOPMENT: ECONOMIC ISSUES AND POLICY CONSID-
ERATIONS 27 (Women's Legal Defense Fund, 1987); William Terrell, Child Support
Expenditure Estimates for Child Support Guidelines, in ESSENTIALS OF CHILD SUP-
PORT GUIDELINES DEVELOPMENT: ECONOMIC ISSUES AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
65 (Women's Legal Defense Fund, 1987)). See WILLIAMS, supra note 49 and accom-
panying text. See also ESPENSHADE, supra note 51 and accompanying text.
110. ERICKSON, supra note 63, at 215 (citing DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1-b)(c)(2))
(emphasis in the original). See DoM. REL. LAw § 240(1-b)(c)(2); FAM. CT. ACT
§ 413(1)(c)(2). Erickson also stated that "additional support for the proposition
that income 'caps' are contrary to federal regulations is [45 C.F.R.] § 302.56(c)(1),
which requires that state guidelines must, as a minimum, 'take into consideration
all earnings and income of the absent parent.'" ERICKSON, supra note 63, at 215
n.81. See 45 C.F.R. § 302.56, supra note 63.
111. See ERICKSON, supra note 63, at 214.
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[S]ection 467(b) of the [Family Support] Act clearly requires
guidelines to be used as a rebuttable presumption in any judicial
or administrative proceeding for the award of child support.
Therefore, while States may not simply exempt an entire category
of cases with incomes above or below a specific dollar level from
application of the guidelines, the application of the guidelines in
those cases may be rebutted as unjust or inappropriate on a case
by case basis .... However, we caution States that criteria for
rebuttal may not be designed to exclude an inordinate number of
cases from application of the guidelines, because to do so would
clearly contravene the intent of the statute that guidelines be the
norm, not the exception for determining support awards.112
E. Treatment of CPI Above $80,000 Prior to Cassano
1. Practitioners' Assumptions
Practitioners considered the CSSA to be "one part mathe-
matical formula, one part discretionary."113 "In the trade, the
equation [was] well known. Mathematical calculations applied
up to $80,000; discretion over $80,000." 114 The prevailing wis-
dom held that the CSSA's presumptive numerical formula "does
not apply to that portion of the combined incomes that exceeds
$80,000. For such moneys, the court is required to examine the
'actual needs' of the children in determining what portion, if
any, of the excess income should be applied to child support."" 5
2. Inconsistencies Among the Lower Courts
While practitioners seemingly agreed on what role CPI
above $80,000 would play in the calculation of child support
awards, lower courts did not agree on their treatment of such
income. Some courts would not consider CPI over $80,000 in
their calculations of child support awards unless warranted
under the circumstances, and such justification was usually
grounded in consideration of the child's actual needs. Other
112. Id. at 214-15 (citing 56 Fed. Reg. at 22,343 (1991)) (emphasis in the origi-
nal). See FSA, supra note 63 and accompanying text.
113. Joel R. Brandes & Carole L. Weidman, The Changes in Calculating Child
Support, N.Y. L.J. May 23, 1995 at 3.
114. Id.
115. Douglas J. Besharov with Ira Lichtiger, Supplementary Practice Com-
mentary 1993, FAm. CT. AcT § 413, at 18 (McKinney Supp. 1995).
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courts, however, were quicker to apply the statutory percentage
to CPI above $80,000, focusing less on the child's actual needs.
a. Application of Statutory Formula If Warranted by
Child's Actual Needs
In Reiss v. Reiss,116 the defendant husband appealed from a
judgment ordering him to pay $634.10 per week for the support
of the parties' four-year-old son.117 The husband's annual in-
come exceeded $80,000.118 The New York State Appellate Divi-
sion, for the Second Department remitted for a new
determination as to child support,119 because "the trial court's
award of over $32,000 per year in child support was excessive
under the circumstances presented."120 The appellate court con-
cluded that the trial court's application of the statutory percent-
ages to CPI above $80,000 "constituted an improvident exercise
of discretion when measured against the parties' respective fi-
nancial circumstances and the reasonable support require-
ments of the parties' son."12 '
The combined income of the parties in Harmon v. Har-
mon 22 equaled approximately $169,500.123 There, the wife was
a "highly educated, experienced and credentialed speech and
hearing pathologist and educational administrator"; 124 the hus-
band was a partner in a prestigious law firm. 2 The trial court
calculated child support for the parties' son by applying the ap-
propriate statutory percentage (17%) to the total CPI.126 The
husband challenged the trial court's award of over $35,000 per
year as "patently excessive for a [twenty]-year-old child living
away at college for most of the year."127 The New York State
Appellate Division, for the First Department agreed with the
husband and remanded for a new determination of child sup-
116. 170 A.D.2d 589, 566 N.Y.S.2d 365 (2d Dep't 1991).
117. See id. at 590, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 367.
118. See id.
119. See id. at 591, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 367.
120. Id. at 590, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 367.
121. Id. at 591, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 367.
122. 173 A.D.2d 98, 578 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1st Dep't 1992).
123. See id. at 101, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 898-99.
124. Id. at 101, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 898.
125. See id. at 101, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 899.
126. See id. at 110, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 904.
127. Id. at 110, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 904.
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port.122 The court opined that "a child is not a partner in the
marital relationship, entitled to a 'piece of the action,'" 129 and
that "to apply blindly the statutory formula to the parties' ag-
gregate income over $80,000 without any express findings or
record evidence of the child's actual needs would constitute both
an abdication of the judicial responsibility and a trespass upon
the right of parents to make lifestyle choices for their
children."'130
In Chasin v. Chasin,131 where the parties' CPI equaled
$166,763,132 the plaintiff wife retained custody of their two chil-
dren.1 33 The trial court had calculated the child support award
by applying the appropriate (25%) statutory percentage to the
total CPI,34 whereupon the husband contended that the
amount of the award was excessive and contrary to the man-
dates of the CSSA.135 The New York State Appellate Division,
for the Third Department agreed and set aside the award of
child support. 13 6 The court concluded that "[t]he blind applica-
tion of the statutory formula to the [CPI] over $80,000 without
any express findings of the children's actual needs constitutes
an abdication of judicial responsibility and renders meaningless
the statutory provision setting a cap on strict application of the
formula."37
The parties in Holmes v. Holmes138 had a CPI of $96,147.139
There, the family court agreed with the Hearing Examiner that
the statutory percentage should apply to the total CPI14° and
the husband was ordered to pay $236 per week for the support
128. Harmon, 173 A.D.2d at 111, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 904.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. 182 A.D.2d 862, 582 N.Y.S.2d 512 (3d Dep't 1992).
132. See id. at 863, 582 N.Y.S.2d at 514.
133. See id. at 862, 582 N.Y.S.2d at 514.
134. See id. at 863, 582 N.Y.S.2d at 514.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. Chasin, 182 A.D.2d at 863, 582 N.Y.S.2d at 514 (citations omitted).
138. 184 A.D.2d 185, 592 N.Y.S.2d 72 (3d Dep't 1992).
139. See id. at 186, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 73.
140. See id. A "Hearing Examiner" is defined generally as "a civil service em-
ployee of an administrative agency whose responsibility is to conduct hearings on
matters within the agency's jurisdiction." BLAci's LAW DICTIONARY 721 (6th ed.
1990).
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of his two children. 141 The husband argued on appeal that the
Hearing Examiner's calculation of child support was "unjust."142
The New York State Appellate Division, for the Third Depart-
ment reversed'4 and held "the Hearing Examiner's application
of the child support percentages to that portion of the parties'
[CPI] exceeding $80,000 was an improvident exercise of discre-
tion."1' The court concluded that although the Hearing Exam-
iner determined there was no reason not to apply the statutory
percentage to the total CPI, 145 the award was improper since
the Hearing Examiner failed to make express findings as to the
children's actual needs.1'
The plaintiff wife in Kessinger v. Kessinger147 challenged
the trial court's award of $316.48 per week for the support of
the parties' infant children.14 There, the parties' CPI equaled
$203,674,149 $177,748 of which was attributable to the hus-
band.150 The New York State Appellate Division, for the Third
Department agreed with the wife that the trial court "applied
an incorrect standard and made insufficient findings in its de-
termination to limit application of the statutory formula to the
$80,000 cap .... "151 The court instructed that where the CPI is
greater than $80,000, the trial court should first apply the stat-
utory percentage to the total CPI152 and then balance that sum
against the children's actual needs, the preseparation standard
141. See Holmes, 184 A.D.2d at 186, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 73.
142. Id.
143. See id. at 188, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 74.
144. Id.
145. See id.
146. See id. See also Panossian v. Panossian, 201 A.D.2d 983, 607 N.Y.S.2d
840 (4th Dep't 1994) (family court erred when it applied the statutory percentage
to CPI above $80,000 without express findings as to child's actual needs); Colley v.
Colley, 200 A.D.2d 839, 606 N.Y.S.2d 796 (3d Dep't 1994) (child support award set
aside based on application of the statutory percentage to CPI above $80,000 and
remitted for hearing as to the parties' financial circumstances and the children's
actual needs); Smith v. Smith, 197 A.D.2d 830, 602 N.Y.S.2d 963 (3d Dep't 1993)
(strict application of the statutory percentages to CPI below $80,000 is improper
absent express findings as to the children's actual needs).
147. 202 A.D.2d 752, 608 N.Y.S.2d 358 (3d Dep't 1994).
148. See id. at 752-53, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 359-60.
149. See id. at 754, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 360.
150. See id.
151. Id.
152. See id.
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of living and the parties' financial circumstances. 53 The appel-
late court concluded that if upon balancing these factors the
support award is determined to be unjust or inappropriate, the
court should then consider the statutory factors154 and establish
the appropriate level of child support. 155
The Third Department took a similar position in Faber v.
Faber.56 There, although the parties' CPI exceeded $80,000,157
the trial court calculated the child support award by applying
the appropriate statutory percentage (17%) only to the CPI be-
low $80,000.158 The plaintiff wife appealed the trial court's
award of $136 per week for child support159 and the New York
State Appellate Division, for the Third Department held that
the trial court improperly based its child support award on CPI
up to $80,000 without any findings as to CPI above $80,000.160
The appellate court explained that the trial court should have
considered the child's actual needs, and should then have ex-
amined the CPI above $80,000, if necessary, in light of those
needs. 161
In Nicholas v. Cirelli,162 the husband earned in excess of
$110,000 per year. 63 The wife had successfully petitioned for
an increase in child support to $262 per week for the parties'
son, 64 which the husband then appealed. 65 The wife had no
income, was not employed outside the home, was the mother of
four children and was "unable to adequately provide for [her
son's] increased needs." 66 The New York State Appellate Divi-
sion, for the Third Department said the award was not exces-
sive 67 and upheld the trial court's application of the statutory
153. See Kessinger, 202 A.D.2d at 754, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 360-61.
154. See Dom. REL. LAw § 240(1-b)(f); FAM. CT. ACT § 413(1)(f). See also
supra note 80.
155. See Kessinger, 202 A.D.2d at 754, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 361.
156. 206 A.D.2d 644, 614 N.Y.S.2d 771 (3d Dep't 1994).
157. See id. at 646, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 773.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. 209 A.D.2d 840, 619 N.Y.S.2d 171 (3d Dep't 1994).
163. See id. at 841, 619 N.Y.S.2d at 172.
164. See id. at 840, 619 N.Y.S.2d at 171.
165. See id.
166. Id.
167. See id. at 841, 619 N.Y.S.2d at 172.
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percentage to only the first $80,000.168 The court concluded
"there was no basis to vary from the presumptively applicable
statutory formula" since the husband did not prove the award
was unjust or inappropriate. 169
The parties in Riseley v. Riseley170 were divorced in 1988.
The divorce judgment awarded the wife custody of the parties'
two children, 171 and ordered the husband to pay "base" support
of $250 per week plus additional support based on a proportion
of earnings above his 1988 "base" salary, plus half the cost of
the children's undergraduate education. 172 In September, 1989
after one of the children came to live with him, the husband
unilaterally reduced his child support payments. 173 In March,
1990, the husband successfully petitioned for a modification of
the divorce judgment. 174 The trial court replaced the "base"
support obligation with an amount calculated by applying the
statutory percentage for one child (17%) to the CPI up to
$80,000,175 but left in effect the divorce judgment's other sup-
port provisions.176 On appeal, the New York State Appellate Di-
vision, for the Third Department held that the trial court erred
in its calculation of child support under the CSSA.177 The ap-
pellate court articulated three bases for its reversal:
First, [the] [slupreme [c]ourt incorrectly segmented defendant's
support obligation, fixing basic support in accordance with the
CSSA but leaving in effect the remaining support provisions of
the judgment of divorce. Because a support award under the
CSSA is intended to satisfy all of a child's basic requirements,
there is a substantial likelihood that [the] [slupreme [clourt's de-
termination made duplicate provision for certain of [one child's]
needs. Second, [the] [slupreme [c]ourt considered only support for
[one child], giving no consideration to [the other child's] needs and
the fact that defendant was providing for them. Third, although
[the] [s]upreme [c]ourt recites in its written decision that it con-
168. See Nicholas, 209 A.D.2d at 841, 619 N.Y.S.2d at 172.
169. Id.
170. 208 A.D.2d 132, 622 N.Y.S.2d 387 (3d Dep't 1995).
171. See id. at 133, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 388.
172. See id. at 133-34, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 388.
173. See id. at 134, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 388.
174. See id.
175. See id. 208 A.D.2d at 134, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 388.
176. See Riseley, 208 A.D.2d at 134, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 388.
177. See id.
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sidered [one child's] actual needs and the [statutory] factors....
there is serious question as to whether the statutory mandate was
actually fulfilled. Significantly, our review of the record discloses
no evidence from which [the child's] needs could be determined or
such as would have permitted intelligent consideration of most of
the statutory factors. 178
Further, the appellate court reiterated its approach to calculat-
ing child support awards, stating that trial courts should first
apply the statutory percentage to CPI up to $80,000 and the
resulting amount should stand if it is sufficient in light of care-
ful consideration of the children's needs. 179 The court specified
that if the resulting amount is not sufficient to meet the chil-
dren's needs, the trial court should order additional support by
applying the statutory percentage to some or all of the CPI
above $80,000 and/or by considering the enumerated statutory
factors. 80 Significantly, the appellate court also clarified
Kessinger:'8'
[That] decision ... should not be read to create a presumption in
favor of an application of the statutory percentage [to CPI above
$80,000]. There is no presumption in favor of either approach and
courts should determine on a case-by-case basis whether (1) to ap-
ply the statutory percentage to some or all of the income over the
$80,000 cap, making specific findings of the children's actual
needs, or (2) to determine the level of support based upon a con-
sideration of the statutory factors. 8 2
178. Id. at 134-35, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 388 (citations omitted). See supra note 80.
179. See Riseley, 208 A.D.2d at 135, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 389. See also Rochler v.
Rochler, 215 A.D.2d 831, 626 N.Y.S.2d 312 (3d Dep't 1995) (where CPI is less than
$80,000, a finding that the basic support obligation exceeds the child's actual needs
may be relevant in determining whether that obligation is unjust or inappropri-
ate); Montagnino v. Montagnino, 208 A.D.2d 631, 617 N.Y.S.2d 354 (2d Dep't
1994) (upheld application of statutory percentage to CPI above $80,000 in light of
parties' circumstances and the child's specific needs); Slankard v. Chahinian, 204
A.D.2d 529, 611 N.Y.S.2d 300 (2d Dep't 1994) (directed trial court to make express
findings as to child's actual needs before considering CPI above $80,000 in calcu-
lating child support award).
180. See Riseley, 208 A.D.2d at 135, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 389. See also supra note
80.
181. See Kessinger, 202 A.D.2d 752, 608 N.Y.S.2d 358 (3d Dep't 1994). See
also supra notes 147-55 and accompanying text.
182. Riseley, 208 A.D.2d at 135 n.1, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 389 n.1 (citation omitted).
See supra note 80.
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Two months later, in Eaton v. Eaton,8 3 the Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, Third Department affirmed the trial court's
calculation of child support. 8 4 There, both parties appealed an
order directing the husband to pay $560 biweekly for the sup-
port of their three children. 8 5 The trial court initially applied
the statutory percentage (29%) to the first $80,000 of CPI.186
Then, after having considered the statutory factors, the parties'
financial circumstances, the children's preseparation standard
of living and their actual needs, the trial court awarded addi-
tional support based on a discretionary 7% of CPI above
$80,000. 187
The husband in Costanza v. Costanza88 challenged an or-
der directing him to pay $760 per week support for the parties'
one child. 8 9 There, the parties' CPI equaled $183,397,190
$153,338 of which was attributable to the husband.' 9' The
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department found
the trial court's award of approximately $40,000 per year in
child support to be excessive. 92 The appellate court postulated
that while the trial court could properly consider the child's
preseparation standard of living in calculating the award, the
award was improper when balanced against the child's actual,
reasonable needs. 193
b. Child's Actual Needs Not the Determining Factor
The New York State Supreme Court, New York County, in
Steel v. Steel, 94 compared calculations of child support awards
before and after the CSSA. 95 The court stated that pre-CSSA,
183. 214 A.D.2d 933, 626 N.Y.S.2d 286 (3d Dep't 1995).
184. See id. at 934, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 287.
185. See id. at 933, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 287.
186. See id. at 933, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 286. The parties' total CPI equaled
$103,124. See id.
187. See id. at 933-34, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 287. See supra note 80 for a discussion
of the statutory factors.
188. 213 A.D.2d 1044, 625 N.Y.S.2d 762 (4th Dep't 1995).
189. See id. at 1045, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 763.
190. See id. at 1045, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 763.
191. See id.
192. See id. at 1046, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 763.
193. See id.
194. 152 Misc. 2d 880, 579 N.Y.S.2d 531 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1990).
195. See id. at 882, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 533.
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courts would commonly calculate child support by adding up
costs attributable to the children and then allocating these costs
between the parents, a method which "almost invariably rele-
gated the child to the standard of living of the custodial parent
alone."196 The court continued:
Any further use of this so-called "cost-allocation" approach would
be in direct conflict with the CSSA, which does not attempt to pro-
vide merely for the "costs" of caring for a child, or even the "needs"
of the child (unless there is special need shown), but is grounded
on the principle that the parents' income and standard of living
should be shared by the child. Under the CSSA, the court is con-
strained to the extent possible, to provide that the child will have
a standard of living appropriate to the income of both parents. 197
In Steel, the mother had custody of the parties' four children.198
The parties' CPI equaled approximately $175,500,199 $149,081
of which was attributable to the father.200 The court chose to
calculate its child support award solely by applying the statu-
tory percentage to the total CPI "[s]ince the amount of child
support indicated by application of the percentage [was] not
manifestly too little or too much."20' The supreme court con-
cluded that children "should not have to live at a standard that
is significantly lower than that enjoyed by the noncustodial
parent.202
In Brown v. Brown,20 3 the defendant husband allegedly
physically and verbally abused his wife and their three children
during the three years prior to the action.204 Subsequent to ob-
taining orders of protection, the wife sued for divorce. 205 The
husband never answered or appeared, either to contest the di-
vorce or in response to a summons for an evidentiary hearing
regarding custody and child support.206 The New York State
Supreme Court, Nassau County awarded the wife custody of the
196. Id.
197. Id. (emphasis in the original).
198. See id. at 881, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 532.
199. See id. at 883, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 533.
200. See Steel, 152 Misc. 2d at 883, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 533.
201. Id. at 884, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 534.
202. Id. at 886, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 535.
203. 204 N.Y. L.J. 30 (1990) (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1990).
204. See id.
205. See id.
206. See id.
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children and ordered the husband to pay $492 per week child
support. 207 The court reached that amount by applying the stat-
utory percentage to the total CPI ($106,734) and stated simply
that it was within its discretion to do so.208
III. Cassano v. Cassano20 9
A. Facts and Procedural History
Maryann and Dominick Cassano divorced in 1986.210
Maryann was awarded custody of their two children and her ex-
husband was ordered to pay $125 per week in child support.211
In 1989, Maryann petitioned for an increase in child support for
the non-emancipated child, pursuant to the newly enacted
CSSA.212 The Hearing Examiner, after an evidentiary hearing,
"found a substantial increase in the parties' financial circum-
stances warranting increased child support"213 and ordered the
father to pay an additional $93 per week in child support, for a
total of $218 per week.2 14 The Hearing Examiner calculated the
award based on the total CPI of $99,944, 64.4% of which was
attributable to the father.215 The total CPI was multiplied by
the applicable statutory percentage (17%) and the father was
207. See id.
208. See id. The CPI was an approximation since the only information the
court had as to the husband's current income was a 1983 W-2 statement. See id.
See also De Bernardo v. De Bernardo, 180 A.D.2d 500, 580 N.Y.S.2d 27 (1st Dep't
1992) (in a decision one month after Harmon, 173 A.D.2d 98,578 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1st
Dep't 1992), the court applied the appropriate statutory percentage to the total
CPI of $133,000 and explained only that the CSSA affords the option of doing so);
Rosen v. Rosen, 204 N.Y. L.J. 31 (1990) (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1990) (acknowl-
edged courts' discretion to apply statutory percentage to CPI above $80,000, and
stated that to do so in the case at bar was appropriate). Contra Harmon, supra
notes 122-30 and accompanying text.
209. 85 N.Y.2d 649, 651 N.E.2d 878, 628 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1995).
210. See id. at 651, 651 N.E.2d at 879, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 11.
211. See id. at 651, 651 N.E.2d at 879-80, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 11-12. Note that
the child support award was calculated prior to enactment of the CSSA. See dis-
cussion infra part II.A.
212. See 85 N.Y.2d at 651, 651 N.E.2d at 880, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 12. See discus-
sion infra part II.C.
213. Cassano, 85 N.Y.2d at 651, 651 N.E.2d at 880, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 12.
214. See id. The father was also ordered to pay 64.4% of the child's private
school costs and unreimbursed medical expenses. See id.
215. See id.
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ordered to pay 64.4% of that amount.216 Subsequently, in
Queens County Family Court, the father argued that the Hear-
ing Examiner's application of the statutory percentage to the
CPI above $80,000 was improper because the Hearing Exam-
iner failed to set forth reasons for doing So. 2 17 The family court
stated that the CSSA permitted courts to determine child sup-
port awards by applying the statutory percentages to CPI above
$80,000, without having to set forth reasons for the award.218
The family court concluded there was no cause to interfere with
the Hearing Examiner's discretion and upheld the modified
child support award.219 The New York State Appellate Division,
for the Second Department subsequently affirmed the modifica-
tion.220 While the appellate court agreed with the father that
the trial court was required to state its reasons for upholding
the application of the statutory percentage to CPI above
$80,000,221 it concluded that this requirement was satisfied by
the trial court's reliance on the Hearing Examiner's recommen-
dations. 222 The New York Court of Appeals unanimously
affirmed.223
B. Decision of the New York State Court of Appeals
The New York Court of Appeals addressed the issue of
whether a "court must articulate a reason for its award of child
support on [CPI] exceeding $80,000 when it chooses simply to
apply the statutory percentage." 224 The court initially discussed
the development of the CSSA and stressed the legislative objec-
tives underlying its enactment. 225 One such objective, noted the
216. See id.; DOM. REL. LAw § 240(1-b)(c)(3); FAm. CT. AcT § 413(1)(c)(3). See
also supra note 79.
217. See Cassano, 85 N.Y.2d at 651-52, 651 N.E.2d at 880, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 12.
218. See id. at 652, 651 N.E.2d at 880, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 12.
219. See id.
220. Cassano v. Cassano, 203 A.D.2d 563, 612 N.Y.S.2d 160, 161 (2d Dep't
1994).
221. See id.
222. See id.
223. Cassano v. Cassano, 85 N.Y.2d 649, 656, 651 N.E.2d 878, 882, 628
N.Y.S.2d 10, 14 (1995).
224. Id. at 654, 651 N.E.2d at 881, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 13.
225. See id. at 652, 651 N.E.2d at 880, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 12. See WEINSTEIN,
supra note 2; GovERNOR'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 2. See also discussion supra
part II.C.
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court, was to shift emphasis "'from a balancing of the expressed
needs of the child and the income available to the parents after
expenses 226 to the total income available to the parents and the
standard of living that should be shared with the child."' 227 The
overall goal of the CSSA, according to the court, was to ensure
that child support awards would be more uniform, predictable
and equitable, while at the same time allowing courts to use
discretion when unique circumstances warrant.22 The court
then examined how child support awards are calculated pursu-
ant to the CSSA and explained that in calculating the child sup-
port obligation on CPI over $80,000 the CSSA explicitly gives a
court the option, based on its discretion, to apply the "para-
graph (f)" factors,229 the applicable statutory percentage, or
both.2o Further, the court stated that because this discretion
"is subject to review for abuse, some record articulation of the
reasons for the court's choice to apply the percentage is neces-
sary to facilitate that review."231 To this end, according to the
court of appeals, if a court chooses to apply the statutory per-
centage to CPI above $80,000, it will satisfy the articulation of
reasons required by simply stating that, after considering the
parties' circumstances, there are no reasons why the percentage
should not apply.232 The court concluded that "[diefendant's in-
226. See, e.g., Kaplan, supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text; Parry,
supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text; Stevens, supra notes 42-45 and accom-
panying text.
227. Cassano, 85 N.Y.2d at 652, 651 N.E.2d at 880, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 12 (quot-
ing Reichler & Lefcourt, supra note 17, at 44). See, e.g., Steel, supra notes 194-202
and accompanying text.
228. See Cassano, 85 N.Y.2d at 652-53, 651 N.E.2d at 880, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 12
(citing WEINSTEIN, supra note 2, and GovERNORs'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 2).
229. See supra note 80.
230. See 85 N.Y.2d at 655, 651 N.E.2d at 882, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 14. The court
noted that its interpretation is consistent with the CSSA's objectives. See id. The
court also articulated the CSSA's "three-step method" for calculating the basic
child support obligation: (1) calculate CPI; (2) multiply the CPI up to $80,000 by
the appropriate statutory percentage and allocate that amount between the par-
ents (based on their share of CPI); (3) to CPI exceeding $80,000, apply the "para-
graph (f)" factors or the applicable statutory percentage or some combination of
both. See id. at 653, 651 N.E.2d at 880-81, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 12-13. See also DOM.
REL. LAW § 240(1-b)(c)(3), (f); FAM. CT. AcT § 413(1)(c)(3), (M; discussion of legisla-
tive objectives, supra part 1.C.
231. Cassano, 85 N.Y.2d at 655, 651 N.E.2d at 882, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 14 (cita-
tions omitted).
232. See id.
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sistence on an elaboration of needs-based reasons.., rolls back
the calendar to pre-1989 law"23 and held that here, application
of the statutory percentage to the CPI above $80,000 was justi-
fied since the record indicated no reason why it should not
apply.234
C. The Aftermath of Cassano: Cases and Commentary
Clearly, according to commentators, the court of appeals'
ruling in Cassano235 "allows judges to apply the [statutory]
formula in high income cases based simply on a finding that
there is no reason to depart from it."23 Nevertheless, in subse-
quent cases the lower courts have hesitated to exercise that op-
tion. In Orofino v. Orofino,237 the plaintiff wife argued that the
New York State Supreme Court, Ulster County, incorrectly cal-
culated its child support award. The trial court had granted
plaintiff a divorce and awarded her custody of the parties' chil-
dren.238 The court determined that the parties' CPI equaled
$139,926, 60% of which was attributable to the husband, and
ordered him to pay $299 per week in child support.239 In reach-
ing that amount, the trial court applied the appropriate statu-
tory percentage (25%) to the first $80,000 of CPI, and then
applied a reduced percentage (10%) to the remaining CPI above
$80,000. 240 The New York State Appellate Division, for the
Third Department upheld the trial court's calculation of child
support, 241 based on the fact that the "[s]upreme [c]ourt consid-
ered the financial situation of both parties and determined that
the financial resources of [the custodial parent] and the children
will be more than sufficient to meet their needs."242
233. Id.
234. See id.
235. 85 N.Y.2d at 849, 651 N.E.2d at 878, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 10. See supra notes
224-34 and accompanying text.
236. Gary Spencer, Child Support Rules Interpreted: Use of Law's Formula
Needs No Explanation, 213 N.Y. L.J., May 10, 1995, at 1. See Brandes & Weid-
man, supra note 113.
237. 215 A.D.2d 997, 627 N.Y.S.2d 460 (3d Dep't 1995).
238. See id. at 997, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 461.
239. See id. at 998-99, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 462.
240. See id. at 999, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 462.
241. See id.
242. Id. at 999, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 462.
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In Jones v. Reese,243 the appellant mother challenged a
judgment of the New York State Family Court, Albany County
which ordered the father to pay $1787 per month for the sup-
port of their child. 244 The Hearing Examiner had originally set
child support at $2700 per month245 but the family court re-
duced that amount, finding that it exceeded the child's needs. 246
The family court relied on Chasin247 and held that the CSSA
should apply to CPI above $80,000 if justified by the child's ac-
tual needs.248 The mother argued on appeal that the CSSA "is
grounded on the principle that the parents' income and their
standard of living should be shared by the child."249 The
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department agreed
and held that the trial court's reduction of the award was con-
traindicated in light of Cassano.250
In Straker v. Straker,251 the plaintiff wife appealed from a
judgment of the New York State Supreme Court, Nassau
County which ordered the husband to pay $900 per month for
child support.252 The New York State Appellate Division, for
the Second Department upheld the trial court's discretionary
refusal to apply the statutory percentage to CPI above
$80,000.253 According to the appellate court, the trial court
properly considered the statutory factors, the financial circum-
stances of the parties, the children's best interests and the re-
quirements of justice.254
243. 217 A.D.2d 783, 629 N.Y.S.2d 311 (3d Dep't 1995).
244. See id. at 783-84, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 311-12.
245. See id. at 784, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 312.
246. See id. at 783-84, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 312.
247. 182 A.D.2d 862, 582 N.Y.S.2d 512 (3d Dep't 1992). See supra notes 131-
37 and accompanying text.
248. See Jones, 217 A.D.2d at 783, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 312.
249. Id. at 784, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 311.
250. See id. at 784, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 312. See also Cassano, 85 N.Y.2d 649, 651
N.E.2d 878, 628 N.Y.S.2d 10, supra notes 224-34 and accompanying text.
251. 219 A.D.2d 707, 631 N.Y.S.2d 767 (2d Dep't 1995).
252. See id. at 707, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 768.
253. See id.
254. See id. See DOM. REL. LAw § 240(1-b)(c)(3), (f); FAM. CT. ACT
§ 413(1)(c)(3),(f). See also Lucille Ann D. v. David F. K, 219 A.D.2d 874, 632
N.Y.S.2d 909 (4th Dep't 1995) (upheld trial court's child support award based on
CPI above $80,000, because the trial court fully explained that its reason for doing
so was grounded in its consideration of the statutory "paragraph (f)" factors); Prys-
tay v. Avildsen, 220 A.D.2d 337, 632 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1st Dep't 1995) (Hearing Exam-
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IV. Analysis
Prior to the enactment of the CSSA, child support awards
were calculated based primarily upon a court's discretion.255 As
a result, discrepancies arose between lower court awards due to
the difference in factors considered, and the weight given to
each, in calculating child support awards.256 There was not only
a lack of uniformity of these awards among the lower courts, 257
but also a lack of predictability as to how each court would cal-
culate the child support obligation in any given circumstance. 258
Enactment of some form of child support guidelines was cer-
tainly necessary in order to provide a level of uniformity, pre-
dictability and equity in child support awards.
In response to a federal mandate, 2 9 the New York Legisla-
ture promulgated the CSSA260 which established presumptive
guidelines for courts to use in their determinations of child sup-
port obligations. 261 The underlying legislative purpose of the
CSSA was to ensure a higher level of consistency and adequacy
of child support awards, as well as to enable children to share in
their parents' wealth.2 2 In light of these stated legislative
goals, however, the success of the CSSA was, at best, limited.
For families with CPI of $80,000 or less, the CSSA indeed pro-
iner properly considered the statutory "paragraph (f)" factors in awarding child
support based on CPI above $80,000). See supra note 80.
255. See Leehy, supra note 14. See discussion supra part II.A.
256. See illustrative cases, supra notes 18-45 and accompanying text.
257. Compare Kaplan v. Kaplan, 77 A.D.2d 891, 430 N.Y.S.2d 692 (2d Dep't
1980) (focus on financial resources of non-custodial parent) with Moran v. Moran,
81 A.D.2d 740, 438 N.Y.S.2d 421 (4th Dep't 1981) (child support calculated by bal-
ancing various aspects of marital relationship and should be in the best interests
of the child) and Stevens v. Stevens, 107 A.D.2d 987, 484 N.Y.S.2d 708 (3d Dep't
1985) (trial court must consider all statutory factors). See supra notes 21-30, 42-45
and accompanying text.
258. Compare Iacobacci v. Iacobacci, 84 A.D.2d 759, 443 N.Y.S.2d 768 (2d
Dep't 1981) (importance of maintaining children's pre-separation standard of liv-
ing) with Kaplan v. Kaplan, 77 A.D.A2d 891, 430 N.Y.S.2d 692 (2d Dep't 1980)
(focus on financial resources of non-custodial parent) and Tornese v. Tornese, 55
A.D.2d 602, 389 N.Y.S.2d 385 (2d Dep't 1976) (balance various aspects of the mari-
tal relationship). See supra notes 18-25, 31-35 and accompanying text.
259. See Federal Family Support Act of 1988, supra note 63 and accompany-
ing text.
260. See supra note 1.
261. See discussion supra, part II.C.
262. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 2; GOVERNOR'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 2.
See also discussion supra part II.C.
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vided uniformity, predictability and equity in child support
awards by mandating application of the appropriate statutory
percentage to the total income. 263 For families with CPI above
$80,000, however, the resulting awards of child support re-
mained inconsistent among the lower courts,264 and many
awards were contrary to the legislative goal of enabling children
to share in the standard of living of their parents.
265
Unpredictable, inconsistent, inequitable awards of child
support to families with CPI above $80,000 persisted because
the CSSA afforded three options for courts to consider in calcu-
lating child support obligations on CPI above $80,000: (1) con-
sider the enumerated statutory factors (one of which is "any
other factors the court determines are relevant") and decide
what, if any, percentage should be applied to that income; (2)
choose to simply apply the appropriate statutory percentage to
that income; (3) utilize some combination of both of these op-
tions.266 Therefore, courts were able to favor whichever option
reflected their individual interpretations of the purpose of child
support awards.
As a result, child support awards were extremely varied.
267
Regardless of the legislative intent underlying the CSSA, many
263. See DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1-b)(c)(2); FAm. CT. ACT § 413(1)(c)(2). See also
discussion supra part II.C.
264. Compare Harmon v. Harmon, 173 A.D.2d 98, 578 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1st Dep't
1992) (to apply statutory percentage to CPI above $80,000 without express find-
ings as to child's actual needs constitutes abdication of judicial responsibility) with
De Bernardo v. De Bernardo, 180 A.D.2d 500, 580 N.Y.S.2d 27 (1st Dep't 1992)
(applied statutory percentage to CPI above $80,000 because CSSA affords the op-
tion of doing so). See supra notes 122-30, 208 and accompanying text. See also
discussion, supra part H.E.
265. See, e.g., Costanza v. Costanza, 213 A.D.2d 1044, 625 N.Y.S.2d 762 (4th
Dep't 1995); Harmon v. Harmon, 173 A.D.2d 98, 578 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1st Dep't 1992);
Chasin v. Chasin, 182 A.D.2d 862, 582 N.Y.S.2d 512 (3d Dep't 1992). See supra
notes 122-37, 188-93 and accompanying text. See also discussion of CSSA's legisla-
tive history, supra part II.C.
266. See DoM. REL. LAW § 240(1-b)(c)(3), (f); FAm. CT. ACT § 413(1)(c)(3), (f).
For a listing of the "paragraph (f)" factors, see supra note 80.
267. Compare, e.g., Reiss v. Reiss, 170 A.D.2d 589, 566 N.Y.S.2d 365 (2d Dep't
1995) (application of statutory percentage to CPI above $80,000 improper when
balanced against parties' financial circumstances and reasonable support require-
ments of the child) and Holmes v. Holmes, 184 A.D.2d 185, 592 N.Y.S.2d 72 (3d
Dep't 1992) (must be express findings of children's actual needs) with Steel v.
Steel, 152 Misc. 2d 880, 579 N.Y.S.2d 531 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1990) (focus on
maintaining child's pre-separation standard of living) and Brown v. Brown, N.Y.
L.J., July 16, 1990, at 30 col. 2 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1990) (within court's dis-
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appellate courts apparently believed that child support should
be awarded only to the extent necessary to provide for what the
court determined to be the child's actual needs.268 Conse-
quently, trial court awards of child support based on application
of the statutory percentage to CPI over $80,000 were often over-
ruled if the appellate court found no indication of express find-
ings as to the child's actual needs. 269
The New York Court of Appeals in Cassano270 reiterated
the impropriety of courts' reliance on needs-based justification
for child support awards based on CPI above $80,000.271 In
Cassano, the court emphasized that one of the underlying legis-
lative goals of the CSSA was to ensure that children would
share in the standard of living of both their parents,272 and
stated that an "insistence on an elaboration of needs-based rea-
sons ... rolls back the calendar to pre-1989 law."273 More im-
portantly, the court held that lower courts may properly apply
the statutory percentage to CPI above $80,000 by simply articu-
lating that, after consideration of the parties' circumstances,
there is no reason why the percentage should not apply.2 7 4 This
holding effectively reversed the prevailing presumption that ap-
plication of the statutory percentage to CPI above $80,000 must
be justified: whereas before Cassano the presumption was that
the statutory percentage did not apply to CPI above $80,000 un-
less circumstances warranted, 275 Cassano clearly indicates that
the statutory percentage is presumed to apply to income above
$80,000 unless circumstances evince it should not apply.2 7 6
Cassano, then, effectively shifts the burden of proof to the party
opposing application of the percentages to CPI above $80,000,
cretion to apply statutory percentage to CPI above $80,000). See supra notes 116-
21, 138-46, 194-208 and accompanying text.
268. See illustrative cases supra notes 116-93 and accompanying text.
269. See illustrative cases supra notes 122-46 and accompanying text.
270. 85 N.Y.2d 649, 651 N.E.2d 878, 628 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1995).
271. See discussion supra part III.B.
272. See Cassano, 85 N.Y.2d at 652, 651 N.E.2d at 880, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 12.
See also discussion supra part III.B.
273. 85 N.Y.2d at 655, 651 N.E.2d at 882, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 14. See discussion
supra part III.B.
274. See 85 N.Y.2d at 655, 651 N.E.2d at 882, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 14. See discus-
sion supra part III.B.
275. See Besharov with Lichtiger, supra note 115 and accompanying text. See
also illustrative cases supra notes 116-93 and accompanying text.
276. See discussion supra part III.B.
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making it more likely that children affected by the separation
will continue to share in the total parental income.277
In reaching the Cassano decision, however, the court of ap-
peals necessarily reaffirmed the various statutory options which
afford courts discretion in their treatment of CPI above
$80,000.278 Herein lies the problem with the holding in Cas-
sano: on one hand, the court held that the statutory percent-
ages presumptively apply to CPI above $80,000 unless there are
reasons why they should not;279 on the other hand, the court
held that lower courts could opt not to apply the statutory per-
centages to CPI above $80,000 and instead consider the statu-
tory factors in calculating the child support award. 0 In other
words, there is a presumption that the statutory percentage ap-
plies to CPI above $80,000, if the court chooses that option to
calculate the child support obligation. If a court chooses the
other option, however, the presumption effectively is that the
statutory percentage applies only to CPI up to $80,000, and any
additional child support award will be at the court's discretion
after consideration of the statutory factors. Because courts are
free to choose either option, according to Cassano, families and
practitioners cannot predict which party will have the burden of
proof in their case. Not only is such unpredictability blatantly
unfair, but nonuniformity of child support awards will likely
persist as courts continue to exercise their options. Further-
more, when courts choose the latter option where the percent-
age presumptively applies only to the first $80,000 of CPI (and
the burden of proof is on the proponent of application of the per-
centages to CPI above $80,000), it becomes less likely that chil-
dren in these situations will continue to share in the standard
277. This resulting shift in the burden of proof is conducive to achieving the
CSSA's legislative goal that children should share in the standard of living of both
parents. See discussion supra part II.C.
278. See Cassano, 85 N.Y.2d at 655, 651 N.E.2d at 882, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 14.
The court of appeals explained that, in calculating child support on CPI above
$80,000, courts may apply the appropriate statutory percentage or the statutory
"paragraph (f)" factors or both. See id. See also discussion supra part III.B. For a
listing of the "paragraph (f" factors see supra note 80. See also DOM. REL. LAW
§ 240(1-b)(c)(3), (f); FAM. CT. AcT § 413(1)(c)(3), ().
279. See 85 N.Y.2d at 655, 651 N.E.2d at 882, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 14. See also
discussion supra part III.B.
280. See 85 N.Y.2d at 655, 651 N.E.2d at 882, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 14. See also
discussion supra part III.B.
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of living of both parents. Clearly, these results are contrary to
the legislative goals underlying the CSSA.281
The court of appeals in Cassano was constrained by both
the statutory language2, 2 and the narrow issue before it. The
issue in Cassano was whether a court must articulate needs-
based reasons for calculating its child support award by apply-
ing the statutory factors to CPI above $80,000. 283 In reaching
its decision, the court had to address the statutory options
available to courts in situations where CPI exceeds $80,000284
in order to explain that the statutory percentage could be pre-
sumptively applied. 28 5 The confusion generated by the court's
reasoning could hardly have been avoided in light of the statu-
tory $80,000 cap and the various statutory provisions address-
ing it.26 The court was bound by the statutory language which
expressly affords courts choices when addressing CPI above
$80,000. 2 7 In articulating the proper interpretation of this lan-
guage,8 8 the court necessarily addressed all the statutory op-
tions in order to avoid rewriting the statute. Ironically, the
decision in Cassano effectively eliminates the statutory cap,
stating that the statutory percentage may presumptively apply
to CPI above $80,000.2 9
Unfortunately, the existence of the statutory cap and the
accompanying statutory options as to CPI above $80,000,290 cou-
pled with the reasoning in Cassano,291 leaves the door open for
courts to presumptively apply the statutory percentage only to
CPI up to $80,000.292 Consequently, while Cassano facially ap-
281. See discussion supra part II.C.
282. See DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1-b)(c)(3), (f); FAM. CT. ACT § 413(1)(c)(3), (f).
283. See Cassano, 85 N.Y.2d at 654, 651 N.E.2d at 881, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 13.
284. See id. at 655, 651 N.E.2d at 882, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 14. See supra note
278.
285. See 85 N.Y.2d at 655, 651 N.E.2d at 882, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 14.
286. See DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1-b)(c), (f); FAM. CT. ACT § 413(1)(c), (f).
287. See DOM. REL. LAw § 240(1-b)(c)(3); FAM. CT. ACT § 413(1)(c)(3).
288. See Cassano, 85 N.Y.2d at 655, 651 N.E.2d at 882, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 14.
289. See id.
290. See DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1-b)(c), (f); FAM. CT. ACT § 413(1)(c), (f). See
also note 80 supra and discussion supra part II.C.
291. See discussion supra part III.B.
292. See Orofino v. Orofino, 215 A.D.2d 997, 627 N.Y.S.2d 460 (3d Dep't 1995);
Straker v. Straker, 219 A.D.2d 707, 631 N.Y.S.2d 767 (2d Dep't 1995); Lucille Ann
D. v. David F. K, 219 A.D.2d 874, 632 N.Y.S.2d 909 (4th Dep't 1995); Prystay v.
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pears to have settled the discrepancies between the courts, 293 it
inherently allows lower court awards of child support to contin-
ually vary. Some courts will choose to apply the statutory per-
centage to CPI above $80,000, while others will choose instead
to apply the statutory factors or some combination of both. In-
deed, the few relevant cases subsequent to Cassano illustrate
that families and practitioners can expect only continued incon-
sistencies in lower court calculations of child support
obligations. 294
The answer to this problem lies in amending the CSSA to
eliminate the $80,000 cap, after which courts would calculate
basic child support obligations295 by applying the appropriate
statutory percentage to the total CPI. The resulting amount
would then be reviewed in light of the "paragraph (f)" factors to
determine whether that amount is unjust or inappropriate. 296
The presumption would therefore be clear; the party in favor of
reducing the award would have the burden of convincing the
court why, in light of the "paragraph (f)" factors, the obligation
should be less than its presumptive amount.
This solution is especially appropriate in view of the pre-
sumption shift following Cassano and its effective elimination of
the statutory cap. 297 Further, eliminating the statutory $80,000
cap would help to achieve the legislative goals underlying the
CSSA.298 Children would be more likely to share in their par-
ents' wealth, since courts would have no choice but to presump-
tively apply the statutory percentage to the total CPI. If the
resulting amount was unjust or inappropriate in light of the
"paragraph (f)" factors, 299 the court could adjust the amount.
Since courts would therefore retain discretion to compensate for
Avildsen, 220 A.D.2d 337, 632 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1st Dep't 1995). See also notes 237-
42, 251-54 supra and accompanying text.
293. See discussion supra part II.E.
294. See supra notes 237-54 and accompanying text.
295. See DOM. REL. LAw § 240(1-b)(b)(1), (c); FAM. CT. ACT § 413(1)(b)(1), (c).
296. See DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1-b)(f); FAm. CT. ACT § 413(1)(f). For a listing
of the "paragraph (f)" factors, see supra note 80. See also discussion supra part
II.C.
297. See discussion supra parts III.B and IV.
298. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 2 and GOVERNOR'S MEMORANDUM, supra note
2. See also discussion supra part II.C.
299. See DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1-b)(f); FAm. CT. ACT § 413(1)(f). For a listing
of the "paragraph (f)" factors, see supra note 80.
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circumstances individual to each case, equitable results would
be achieved. Additionally, if the cap were eliminated, the point
at which the court's discretion would first apply would be abso-
lutely defined. In every case, then, the court's discretion would
come into play only after the statutory percentage had been ap-
plied to the total CPI. More importantly, practitioners and fam-
ilies would know, in every case, which party has the burden of
proof, what that party has to show, and at what point its burden
begins. Simple fairness then, if nothing else, dictates that the
CSSA's statutory cap must be eliminated.
V. Conclusion
The legislative goals underlying the enactment of the CSSA
have not been fully realized. When calculating a child support
obligation based on CPI above $80,000, courts retain substan-
tial discretion regarding the treatment of such income. As a re-
sult, families and practitioners cannot accurately predict the
amount of child support which may be awarded by lower courts.
Additionally, these awards may not result in the children shar-
ing fully in their parents' standard of living.
The New York Court of Appeals' decision in Cassano was a
step in the right direction. There, the court stated it is proper
for lower courts to presumptively apply the statutory percent-
age to CPI above $80,000, if they so choose. The court also
stressed the impropriety of a needs-based analysis in calculat-
ing child support obligations, since requiring that child support
awards be justified in light of the child's actual needs runs con-
trary to the goals of the CSSA. But the Cassano court did not go
far enough to address the problem. Unfortunately, the court's
reasoning was necessarily constrained by the narrowness of the
issue and the presence of the statutory cap, which resulted in
the court's reaffirmation of a lower court's discretion to utilize
various statutory options when calculating child support obliga-
tions on CPI above $80,000. As a result, courts may still choose
whether or not to presumptively apply the statutory percentage
to CPI above $80,000 when they calculate child support awards.
For example, based on Cassano, a court that has applied the
statutory percentage to income up to $80,000 could then con-
sider the "paragraph (f)" factors and properly decide not to ad-
dress CPI above $80,000 at all. Or, a court could properly
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decide to apply the statutory percentage to total CPI. The prob-
lem is, because the courts retain such wide discretion as to their
treatment of CPI above $80,000, calculations of child support
obligations will continue to be at least unpredictable and per-
haps even inequitable.
The solution is to amend the CSSA to eliminate the $80,000
cap. Elimination of the cap is a crucial prerequisite to full at-
tainment of the legislative goals which underscore the CSSA:
predictability and equity in child support awards. Elimination
of the cap would increase the predictability of child support
awards by absolutely defining the point at which the court's dis-
cretion applies. Additionally, it would define the burden of
proof by clarifying and unifying the presumptive treatment of
CPI above $80,000. At the same time, courts would retain dis-
cretion to adjust the presumptive award should the amount be
unjust or inappropriate, thereby ensuring equitable outcomes.
Finally, while uniformity of child support awards may not al-
ways be achieved, uniformity is not necessarily a desirable goal.
Uniformity does not accommodate individual circumstances, so
uniform results may be contrary to equitable results. Uniform-
ity's main function, however, is to ensure predictability. Elimi-
nation of the cap would do just that, allowing practitioners and
families to finally be sure of how New York courts will calculate
child support awards.
Laurie Dichiara
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